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CBEST vs TIBER-EU vs DORA TLPT vs iCAST: how the threat-led testing frameworks compare

Who each framework applies to, how the phases line up, what each asks of providers, and how to run one programme across several regimes.

APAndy PlayfordFounder and principal analyst7 min read
Bottom line

DORA TLPT is the legal obligation for identified EU financial entities. TIBER-EU is the method most EU authorities use to meet it. CBEST is the UK's own supervisory regime, and iCAST is the Hong Kong Monetary Authority's equivalent under C-RAF. All four follow the same shape: prepare, gather threat intelligence, attack, close. They differ in who triggers the test, who may deliver it and how prescriptive the rules are. The threat intelligence phase decides how useful every one of them is.

Which framework applies to you?

Answer two questions for a quick view. It is a starting point, not legal advice. Your authority's notification is what counts.

01Where are your regulated entities?
02Has an authority told you to test?

Select at least one jurisdiction.

The four frameworks at a glance

Tap a framework to highlight its column.

CBEST, TIBER-EU, DORA TLPT and iCAST compared
AttributeCBESTTIBER-EUDORA TLPTiCAST
JurisdictionUnited KingdomEU and EEA, adopted nationallyEuropean UnionHong Kong
OwnerBank of England, PRA and FCAEuropean Central Bank and national authoritiesEU legislation, run by national TLPT authoritiesHong Kong Monetary Authority
Legal statusSupervisory frameworkFramework; binding only where an authority applies itRegulation (EU) 2022/2554, Arts. 26–27, and Delegated Regulation (EU) 2025/1190Supervisory expectation under C-RAF
Who is testedSystemically important firms and FMIs, at the regulators’ requestEntities selected by the national authorityFinancial entities identified by their competent authorityAuthorized institutions, by C-RAF inherent risk
FrequencySet within the supervisory cycleSet nationallyAt least every three yearsSet through the C-RAF cycle
Red team testingScenario-led, on live systemsScenario-led, on live production systemsAt least 12 weeks of active testing, on live production systemsScenario-based attack simulation
Purple teamingNot mandatedPart of closureMandatory in closureNot mandated
ProvidersCREST-accredited CBEST providersSelected against TIBER-EU procurement guidanceArticle 27 requirements; threat intelligence always externalQualified practitioners, per HKMA expectations
OutcomeRemediation plan agreed with the regulatorRemediation plan and attestationRemediation plan and attestationResults and remediation reported to the HKMA

Summary for orientation, reviewed November 2026. Check your authority’s current documentation before you scope.

How the four fit together

The frameworks share a lineage. The Bank of England launched CBEST in 2014, the first regulator-led programme to test banks against attacks built from threat intelligence. The Dutch central bank built TIBER-NL on that experience, and the ECB generalised it into TIBER-EU in 2018. The HKMA set up iCAST as part of its Cyber Resilience Assessment Framework under the Cybersecurity Fortification Initiative, launched in 2016.

DORA then turned the idea into law. It requires threat-led penetration testing but leaves the method to technical standards, and those standards were written to match TIBER-EU. The simplest way to hold it in your head:

  • DORA sets the obligation for identified EU entities.
  • TIBER-EU describes the method, and most EU authorities run TLPT through it.
  • CBEST and iCAST are self-contained regimes that both require and describe the test.
  1. 2014CBESTBank of England launches intelligence-led testing for UK finance.
  2. 2016iCAST and TIBER-NLHKMA launches C-RAF; the Netherlands starts TIBER-NL.
  3. 2018TIBER-EUECB publishes the European framework.
  4. 2024STAR-FSUK regulators add a firm-led route alongside CBEST.
  5. Jan 2025DORA appliesTLPT becomes law for identified EU entities.
  6. 2025TIBER-EU and RTSTIBER-EU is updated to match DORA, and the TLPT technical standards come into force.

Phase by phase

All four frameworks follow the same four stages, even where the names differ. The threat intelligence stage is where the test is designed.

PrepareThreat intelligenceAttackClose
CBESTInitiationThreat intelligence phasePenetration testingClosure and remediation
TIBER-EUPreparationTargeted threat intelligenceRed team testClosure, replay, attestation
DORA TLPTPreparationTargeted threat intelligenceRed team test, 12+ weeksClosure, purple teaming, attestation
iCASTScopingThreat intelligenceAttack simulationReporting

Most firms should plan for the best part of a year from initiation to closure. Preparation and procurement often take longer than expected. Under DORA the active red team phase alone is at least twelve weeks. The threat intelligence phase is shorter, usually four to six weeks, but every later stage depends on it.

What the threat intelligence phase must deliver

Whatever the framework, the intelligence provider answers the same three questions for the authority and the red team:

  1. What can an attacker see?The entity’s digital footprint: people, infrastructure, technology and suppliers, from an outsider’s view.
  2. Who would attack, and why?The actors with the intent and capability to target the critical functions in scope, drawn from the sector and regional threat landscape.
  3. How would they do it?Actor-led scenarios mapped to MITRE ATT&CK, which the red team turns into its test plan.

The output carries different names: the targeted threat intelligence report under TIBER-EU and DORA, the threat intelligence report under CBEST, and a threat intelligence assessment for iCAST. In every case it is reviewed by the control team and the authority before testing starts. That is why sourcing, grading and confidence statements matter: every scenario has to survive scrutiny from people who did not write it.

Under TIBER-EU the national authority may also publish a Generic Threat Landscape report for its sector. Treat it as a baseline. The targeted report has to show why specific actors matter to this entity.

What each framework asks of providers

  • CBEST. Threat intelligence and penetration testing providers must hold CREST CBEST accreditation, and individuals need the matching qualifications. The same applies to STAR-FS.
  • TIBER-EU. The entity procures providers against the framework’s procurement guidance: relevant experience, references, qualified staff, insurance and separation of duties.
  • DORA TLPT. Article 27 and the RTS require testers of the highest suitability and reputation, with technical capability, certification or adherence to a formal code of conduct, and professional indemnity insurance. The threat intelligence provider must always be external, even where internal testers run the red team.
  • iCAST. The HKMA expects suitably qualified and experienced practitioners. Check the current C-RAF guidance for recognised qualifications.

Whichever regime applies, ask every bidder for the CVs of the people who will do the work, not just the firm’s credentials. The quality of a threat intelligence report depends on its lead analyst.

Running one programme across several regimes

Groups with entities in the UK, the EU and Hong Kong can face more than one test in the same cycle. Some work can be shared, and some cannot.

Usually reusable

  • Threat landscape and actor research
  • Digital footprint of shared group infrastructure
  • Control team structure and governance
  • Remediation tracking

Usually separate

  • Scope and critical functions per entity
  • Scenarios tailored to each jurisdiction’s actors
  • Authority review and sign-off
  • Attestation or regulatory close-out

Within the EU, DORA provides for TLPT to be recognised across competent authorities, so one test can cover several entities if the authorities agree. Across the UK and EU, or the EU and Hong Kong, plan for coordinated but separate tests. Agree the approach with every authority before scope is fixed. Changing it later costs months.

Key judgements
  1. EU threat-led testing is converging on a single model. TIBER-EU’s 2025 update and the RTS make a TIBER test and a DORA TLPT largely interchangeable in practice. High confidence
  2. As DORA TLPT volumes grow, authorities will scrutinise the quality of threat intelligence more closely, especially how well scenarios are evidenced and how they link to critical functions. Moderate confidence
  3. Groups spanning the UK, EU and Hong Kong will increasingly coordinate tests across regimes, but full mutual recognition between UK and EU regimes is unlikely in the near term. Moderate confidence
So what Find out now which regime each of your entities falls under, and whether a notification is likely in the next cycle. Map your critical or important functions to the third parties behind them, because DORA expects suppliers to take part. Choose your threat intelligence provider on the strength of its analysts, and agree scope with every authority involved before fixing it.

Frequently asked questions

Is a TIBER-EU test the same as DORA TLPT?

Not quite, but they are close. DORA sets the legal requirement and the RTS sets minimum standards. TIBER-EU was updated in 2025 to meet those standards, so where an authority runs TLPT through TIBER-EU, one test satisfies both.

Does DORA apply to UK firms?

Not to UK entities directly. A UK group with EU-regulated subsidiaries can have those subsidiaries identified for TLPT by their EU authorities. UK entities fall under CBEST or STAR-FS instead.

Can you fail a CBEST, TIBER-EU or DORA TLPT?

No. None of them is pass or fail. They end with findings, a remediation plan and, under TIBER-EU and DORA, an attestation that the test met the requirements.

How often is TLPT required under DORA?

At least every three years for identified entities. The competent authority can change that frequency for an individual entity based on its risk profile.

Who chooses the threat scenarios?

The threat intelligence provider proposes them in the targeted threat intelligence report. The control team and the authority review and agree them before the red team builds its test plan.

Does iCAST apply to every bank in Hong Kong?

No. Whether iCAST is expected depends on the institution’s C-RAF inherent risk assessment. Higher-risk institutions are expected to run intelligence-led testing.

Sources and assessment notes

AP
Andy PlayfordFounder and principal analyst, ThreatInsights. Leads threat intelligence for TIBER-EU, DORA TLPT and iCAST engagements.LinkedIn

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